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function. As Professor Preble Stolz has argued, there are good reasons for being concerned about the state courts when it comes to
correcting errors of federal law:
The lack of effective supervision over state courts in their enforcement of fed·
era) law is much riskier than is the de facto final lawmaking power of the federal
courts of appeals .... Numerous intangible factors tend to make federal judges
loyal to the influence as well as the command of the Supreme Court. . . . In con·
trast, there is relatively little beyond the constitutionally required oath that binds
the more than 200 state supreme court judges to the United States Supreme
Courtl5

Yet in the name of federalism, the Court in recent decades has
often cut back on the extent to which federal lower courts can review or forestall state court error on matters offederallaw.16 When
the Court construes narrowly federal habeas corpus and civil rights
statutes allowing federal trial courts to enforce vital federal rights, it
often leaves itself as the only available federal forum for the correction of possible state court error. Before the Justices or the rest of
us accept any proposal to reduce further the extent to which the
Supreme Court can correct error in individual cases, we should take
into account how well the rest of the system protects litigants
against error and injustice.

THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA. By Lee C.
Bollingert New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1986.
Pp. 295. $19.95.
James Magee2

Nearly a decade ago, the highly publicized Skokie case
presented one of the most dramatic and controversial free speech
issues ever to arise in American courts. It involved an attempt by a
few dozen members of the National Socialist Party to march
through the streets of Skokie, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago inhabited by some forty thousand Jews of whom several thousand were
15. Stolz, Federal Review of State Coun Decisions on Federal Questions: The Need for
Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 959-60 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
16. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (excluding fourth amendment claims
from federal habeas review of state convictions in most cases); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) (requiring more than irreparable harm for federal court to enjoin pending state criminal prosecution).
I. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware.
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survivors of Nazi concentration camps. The United States Supreme
Court refused to review the lower courts' conclusions that the first
amendment provided constitutional protection to the inhumane
Nazi messages. The judges in Skokie were at pains to denounce
Nazi doctrines as utterly evil. Yet they felt bound to protect expression of these doctrines; the first amendment, they insisted, dictated
that result.
The Skokie controversy led many observers to reconsider the
purposes and scope of freedom of speech. Such a reconsideration is
precisely the aim of Professor Lee C. Bollinger's book. About Skokie he says: "Here individuals were advocating an ideology the
country had invested incalculable resources only a few decades ago
to defeat; now it was being protected in its efforts to resurrect itself.
Surely, many wondered, there is something disturbingly anomalous
about that." The judicial opinions in Skokie, he says, "convey a
strong sense of helplessness on the part of the judges. The dominant image suggested by the opinions is that of judges compelled to
reach the results they did." Although Professor Bollinger finds reasons, derived from his own theory of free speech, to protect the expression in Skokie, he is dissatisfied with "the current explanations
and theories for the modem concept of freedom of speech, particularly as they apply to cases involving what we think of as extremist
speech."
I

Is it possible to discern or even to imagine a general theoretical
principle that will integrate the disparate decisions of the Supreme
Court since its first serious encounter with the first amendment in
Schenck v. United States? Do we have (or have we ever tried to
develop) a similar theory, for example, of the commerce clause?
Constitutional law tends to be an accumulation of policy choices
made over time by judges responding to a variety of lawsuits in
which important societal interests conflict. Sometimes these choices
form a consistent pattern; but often they do not. The complete incoherence of commerce clause decisions between 1890 and 1937 exemplifies constitutional inconsistency; the judiciary's partial
withdrawal from the commerce field is probably the only reason
that a more consistent pattern has existed since 1937. The highs
and lows of the Court's roller coaster adjudication of free speech
claims of the last five decades would seem to foreclose any possibility of theoretical integrity in that realm as well.
Bollinger's goal is less ambitious and thus more realistic. Instead of trying to reconcile all the decisions, he wants to find a prin-
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ciple that will justify freedom of expression, particularly in cases
involving "extremist" speech that is "unworthy of protection in itself and might very well be legally prohibited for entirely proper
reasons."
Before he fully articulates his own free speech principle, Bollinger dissects and rejects what he sees as the two prevailing rationales
for modem first amendment jurisprudence.
THE CLASSICAL MODEL

He begins with the "classical" defense of freedom of speech,
which he finds evolving from John Milton's Areopagitica to Harry
Kalven's laudatory evaluation of Justice Brennan's opinion in New
York Times v. Sullivan. Contributors to the progress of the classical
theory have included such notables as John Stuart Mill, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Zechariah Chafee, Louis Brandeis, Alexander
Meiklejohn, and, of course, Kalven and Brennan.
Their "classical" version derives from the principal preoccupations in the political thought of the Enlightenment: human reason
and limited government. Reason could produce truth, and truth
would facilitate wise political decisions; government, therefore,
should not stifle freedom of expression, the most reliable means of
attaining truth and advancing knowledge. This presupposition expanded inexorably to include the correlative values of individual autonomy and development through self-expression. Brandeis,
Chafee, Meiklejohn, and Brennan emphasized the importance of
free speech as the primary vehicle to achieve "democratic self-government." This was the "central meaning" of the first amendment,
according to Kalven.
Bollinger concedes, as of course one must, that freedom of
speech is closely associated with the quest for truth and knowledge
and that it is essential in a democracy. Yet he has no difficulty
discerning confusion and paradox in the classical theory, as applied
to the extremist speech found in Skokie. Extremist speech "seeks to
subvert the truth-seeking process"; as applied to such speech the
classical model is "a commitment to a principle of free speech
[which] can lead to protection of those who would advocate the
abolition of free speech itself."
Some defend the classical model in language that suggests that
the first amendment's purpose is to prevent the government from
imposing its will on the people, who should be left free to govern
themselves. "The first amendment has not been confined," however, writes Bollinger, "to imposing limits on errant, undemocratic,
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official efforts to control speech but on democratically sponsored
efforts as well."
[F]ew if any of the restrictions on free speech we have encountered over the last
sixty years, and the rejection of which now form [sic) the basis of our First Amendment jurisprudence, could be fairly described as jeopardizing the elemental structure of a democracy-or, stated another way, that the absence of these regulations
was the sine qua non of a democratic political system.

If the fundamental purpose of free speech is to guarantee selfgovernment, does it make sense to prohibit the people of Skokie
from preventing intentional Nazi bombardment of the fragile sensibilities of vulnerable survivors of the holocaust? Of course, we can
say that by constitutional design in the first amendment the people
have denied themselves the right to make these decisions; but that
seems little better than saying that the people have denied themselves the right to preserve self-government.
Not content to make telling criticisms of the classical model,
Professor Bollinger cavalierly brushes aside some of the architects
of modern free speech jurisprudence. He hardly mentions Thomas
Emerson, and dismisses Justice Black's first amendment jurisprudence as mere "legerdemain."3 Moreover, Holmes's "free trade in
ideas" metaphor strikes Bollinger as ridiculous: "Holmes's proposal
that truth will naturally emerge victorious ... [has] the Pollyannaish claim that the truth will always win out as a natural result of
evolutionary processes. . . ."
The pithy Holmes may be justly criticized for metaphors that
glided past some tough issues. But we should not oversimplify his
thought. He never asserted what Bollinger attributes to him, at
least not in his "classic" dissent in Abrams v. United States. Bollinger quotes it at length:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.

Although Bollinger's quotation stops here, Holmes continued:
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have
to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.

It is difficult to comprehend how any sensible reader can deduce from the sentiments expressed in these passages a conviction
3. My own views on Justice Black are set forth in J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK:
ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT (1980).
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that the "natural result" of evolutionary forces is that truth will
"emerge victorious." Holmes gave no assurance that truth will always be reached, but only that the "competition of the market" is
the best test of truth, better than censorship, and "that at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution." A moral relativist, Holmes could
hardly have been Bollinger's Pollyanna; indeed his letters reveal
that he had difficulty justifying freedom of speech.4
Nevertheless, Bollinger is correct when he says that the classical model provides little assistance to those who grapple with cases
involving extremist speech, the purpose of which is ultimately to
destroy the values that the classical model enshrines as fundamental.
THE FORTRESS MODEL

"[A] more complex and less naive understanding of the role of
free speech in modem society," Professor Bollinger continues, is "to
secure the boundary of protected speech at some considerable distance from the speech activity we truly prize." The goal is to erect
a fortress around the valuable speech that merits protection. The
price to pay, of course, is the protection of socially undesirable
speech. Whereas the classical model built upon the assumption
"that people are rational, capable, and worthy of trust, ... [t]he
fortress model builds upon an opposite vision of people-that they
are moved by irrational impulses and are not to be trusted, not, at
least, when it comes to deciding what the limits on speech activity
within the society should be." The open marketplace in which the
people engage in the "free trade in ideas" therefore becomes
suspect.
Bollinger illustrates the fortress model with an argument from
the prologue to Aryeh Neier's book, Defending My Enemy, in
which Neier, as a Jew and executive director of the American Civil
Liberties Union during the Skokie litigation, sought to justify the
ACLU's role in defending the Nazi march. Neier's position, Bollinger explains, is basically "a matter of self-protective political strategy, a response to a perceived reality of ever-threatening intolerance
and prejudice by the politically powerful against the politically
weak." The fortress model creates a legal principle as "a refuge, but
one oddly secured by admitting into it the archenemy. . . . From
4. "I wonder if cosmically an idea is any more important than the bowels," Holmes
once wrote in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock. As quoted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR: WHAT MANNER OF LIBERAL? 97 (D. Burton ed. 1979). "The theme of the 'unknowable'
runs through his letters as it runs through his speeches," Daniel Boorstin has written. /d. at
133. Bollinger himself tells us that Holmes saw the basis of freedom of speech "as a commit·
ment to an intellectual stance of self-doubt." Can we discern a Pollyanna here?
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this fear of being a persecuted minority the fortress model derives
its appeal."
Bollinger concedes the obvious, if troublesome, allure of the
fortress model. It provides legal shelter against the surges of intolerance that too frequently impel the actions of those wielding political power. While the classical model, when stripped of its florid
rhetoric, appears irrelevant and contradictory, the fortress model
does account for extreme cases and deals more realistically with the
characteristics of mass society.
It offers a way of conceiving of free speech at the outer perimeter that is comprehensive and unblinkingly realistic. It offers a practical, pragmatic perspective of the
world. It is conscious of the threat of conflict within the society and of the need for
barriers to keep power from falling into the hands of those who will be inclined to
sacrifice freedom for orthodoxy. It focuses, furthermore, on the process of presenting the free speech principle, not just on the particular results to be reached.

With the fortress model, "[y]ou have at least preserved something
of value, and possibly the activity you have thus preserved will itself
become a means of dealing effectively with the larger phenomenon
of intolerance, if only by offering the opportunity to notify one's
allies of the approaching danger in other areas."
The fortress model tends to justify an absolutist first amendment standard. It confers constitutional protection upon loathsome
speech. It can explain, if not justify, some of the courts' more extreme libertarian decisions.
While he recognizes its appeal, Bollinger finds the fortress
model "seriously incomplete." "Probably the most serious cost of
the fortress approach is the problem of introducing an unattractive
elitist outlook into free speech thinking and analysis." That is, the
fortress model envisions a "we" and "they," and thus "alienation
between groups. Free speech becomes a divisive force within the
community." The strategy of the model generates "a warfare
mentality" and "can rest on a highly troublesome conception of social reality." "While the fortress perspective may not be dismissible
as irrelevant to the actual world we inhabit, or as illogical, there
may be other and better means of securing the ends we seem to be
seeking through the idea of free speech." Besides, "the fortress
model simply does not account for all that we derive from the principle, especially when it is applied at the extremes."
Bollinger never explains why or how the fortress model might
create a "warfare mentality." Do people degenerate into "we/they"
groups because of a scholarly theory? Does society pay attention to
the intricacies of theoretical models or the reasoning employed by
lawyers and judges to settle difficult first amendment issues? Profes-
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sor Bollinger's elaborate discussion does not extend to these obvious
questions. He merely assumes that allegiance to the fortress model
has divisive effects. It is difficult to see why this should be so.
II

The rest of the book is devoted to Bollinger's own "general
tolerance theory," most if not all aspects of which, he concedes, can
be found in earlier writings. Various forces, however, (such as the
unending rhetoric about liberty and self-government) have worked
to submerge or diminish the primacy of the tolerance ethic which
he insists is at the heart of the free speech enterprise in America.
Thus, while his theory is rooted in earlier justifications, it has not
been the articulated centerpiece of first amendment writings.
Bollinger envisions freedom of speech, not so much as a manifestation of individual freedom recognized as fundamental by the
Constitution and enforceable by courts, but as a social phenomenon
with tremendous potential to create and shape a community. "In
this view the social function of free speech is to provide a focus on
the mind behind the act of intolerance [that moves to suppress
expression] rather than to protect the activity of speech itself as
something that possesses independent value." Proper toleration of
speech, especially extremist speech, can generate a way of thinking,
a social character that encourages tolerance in other areas of social
interaction. "In that role free speech is a complex enterprise that
has a more involved function than preventing governmental interference in the democratic process, maximizing the flow of data, or
protecting the rights of speech for minorities against tyrannical majorities." The concern is not with the worthiness or value of particular expression but "something potentially problematic in the
public response to speech acts."
Free speech cases-especially those like Skokie-provide public drama in which the virtue of tolerance competes with the natural
human impulse toward intolerance; toleration here teaches society
general tolerance elsewhere, in other dimensions of collective
human existence. Toleration helps to define the community and its
values. Advocates of the fortress model seek a fixed, nearly absolute
standard that would protect expression and avoid litigation; for
them Skokie was an easy case. Yet Bollinger carefully reminds us
that excessive tolerance can "destroy the collective bonds that normally hold society together." Moreover, litigation should be seen
"as an opportunity rather than a reason for distress. . . . [It] provides the framework, the occasion, for the community to think
about the things free speech is intended to raise for thought." Sko-
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kie, for instance, provided the occasion for a dramatic lesson in toleration; the occasion was lost, according to Bollinger, because of
what he regards as a nearly mindless rejection of the asserted social
interest in suppressing the Nazi march. Such dogmatic decisions
reflect an intolerant defense of tolerance which exhibits "precisely
the intolerant mind that the [tolerance ethic] is intended to point up
and condemn."
The obvious alternative to "dogmatic" first amendment jurisprudence is "balancing the interests." Many liberals object to balancing of interests in free speech cases, partly because of the
subjectivity (and hence unpredictability) of that endeavor, but also,
and more importantly, because of the Supreme Court's abuse of the
balancing approach during the dismally intolerant years of McCarthyism.s Bollinger wishes to resurrect balancing to serve as the
technique for resolving speech cases through the nurturing of the
tolerance ethic in American society. "The recognition of complexity," he explains, "ought to be the first rule ... of effective free
speech application. Judges may distinguish themselves from other
decision makers in the degree to which they are able to engage in
that recognition." In discussing balancing and the limits on speech,
he says:
The starting point would seem to be this: Certain extraordinary times and conditions exist in any society in which it is quite simply too much to expect of people
that they be self-restrained toward speech behavior, and under which it would be
counterproductive to the aspirational aims of free speech to insist on toleration.

"Balancing looks dangerous," Bollinger admits, "depending on
what is being balanced." "By taking free speech according to its
function of helping to create a tolerance ethic within the society,"
however, "that method is both transformed and rendered more
appealing."

III
Professor Bollinger's theory raises a host of questions. First,
are judges really better able than other politicians to develop the
tolerant mind necessary to do the job Bollinger assigns them? Second, how will we overcome the notorious faults of balancing tests?
While he discovers virtues (presumably, flexibility and discretion) in
the ambiguity of balancing doctrine, Bollinger offers very little guidance for courts. This is particularly disturbing in a book that begins by asserting that tolerance itself sometimes "constitutes moral
5. See generally Alfange, The Balancing of Interests in Free Speech Cases: In Defense
of an Abused Doctrine, 2 L. TRANSITION Q. 35 (1965).
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weakness and is itself properly to be condemned." The book offers
very few details and refers to maybe a dozen cases, but, with the
exception of Skokie, in only marginal ways. How, for example, are
judges to resolve speech cases in which both sides are intolerant?
"As with everything," writes Bollinger, "good things may be
done for the wrong reasons, and with free speech the reasons are
what matter most." Thus inquiry into motivation is essential to the
operation of the tolerance theory. Bollinger explains that "if one
looks not at the speech but at the motivation behind the restrictions,
one may properly conclude that the restrictions were imposed for
bad reasons." Yet earlier in the book he had rejected judicial scrutiny of motivation: "It is simply too difficult to make a case-by-case
examination of legal restraints on speech to ascertain whether the
underlying motivations are of an improper variety. The problem of
the impulse to excessive intolerance is simply too elusive for that
type of scrutiny."
Bollinger's abstractions must confront some hard, challenging
data. One very plain problem with his theory can be seen in the
Skokie case itself. The American Civil Liberties Union's decision to
support the Nazi group led to massive defections from its ranks and
a corresponding financial loss of over $500,000. If the impulse toward intolerance can be exposed within the country's most forceful,
articulate, and organized advocate of individual rights, is it plausible that judicial declarations in favor of extremist expression will
wear down the deeper and broader base of intolerance among the
general public? The evidence seems to be overwhelmingly against
such a possibility.
Although badly disfigured by a combination of militant social
intolerance and timid judges in the 1950s, freedom of speech was
renewed and flourished in the 1960s under the Warren Court. Most
of the Warren-era decisions survived the tenure of the Burger
Court. If Bollinger's thesis is empirically valid, then presumably
Americans are now more tolerant than they were before the Court's
lessons in tolerance. Yet the evidence suggests otherwise. Prior to
this resurrection of freedom of speech, during the end of the McCarthy era, social scientists examined the American public's attitudes toward tolerance and civil liberties. Herbert McClosky was
one researcher who discovered that the American public then was
not very tolerant of anything other than orthodox political and social opinions-where the first amendment, of course, is ordinarily
not needed.6 More than a generation later, in the wake of unprece6. McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. PoL Sci. REV.
361 (1964).
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dented legal protection for freedom of speech, one would expect a
wider and deeper diffusion of the toleration ethic-assuming the
validity of Bollinger's argument that protection of controversial
speech helps to create a tolerant public.
The unpleasant truth, however, is that the general public has
been unable to learn the tolerance ethic even in the narrow area of
freedom of speech itself, much less in the broader realm of nonspeech behavior. In a recent book McClosky and Alida Brill arrive
at conclusions about toleration in America that are not significantly
different from the depressing assessment which McClosky had
made a generation earlier.7 While the public today, as before, overwhelmingly supports freedom of speech as an abstract ideal, it exhibits an intolerant mind when that ideal is applied to concrete (and
hardly extremist) examples of expression.
The contemporary data compiled by McClosky and Brill
demonstrate persuasively that "freedom of speech is, in the public
mind, a more tenuous right than one might infer from the nearly
universal endorsement it receives when stated in its abstract form."s
For example, only 23 percent would allow a group access to a public building to make a speech denouncing the government; almost
half would deny foreigners who dislike or criticize the American
government entry into the United States. In the area of symbolic
expression, "only a small minority of the general public (about one
in four) are willing to endorse the right to make political statements
by means of dramatic or shocking actions. Even actions which appear to be relatively harmless are not widely tolerated." If a professor at a university were "suspected of spreading false ideas" in the
classroom, nearly 80 percent of the population would "send someone into his classes to check on him. "9
These findings raise grave doubts about Bollinger's tolerance
theory. Assuming that tolerance toward speech teaches us other
forms of tolerance (a connection which Bollinger never empirically
demonstrates), we must first cultivate toleration of freedom of
speech itself. The general population, it seems, has learned very little toleration since the 1950s, despite many libertarian judicial decisions. McClosky and Brill conclude, moreover, that the American
public's general intolerance toward expression is evident in nearly
every dimension of behavior which we tend to regard as falling
within the framework of civil liberties.w
7. H. McCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE:
BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983).
8.
9.
10.

/d. at 54.
/d. at 52-54, 108.
/d. See ch. 9.
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This is not to say that Professor Bollinger is wholly mistaken.
The general public does not appear to have become more tolerant,
but opinion leaders may be different. Indeed, there is a wide chasm
between the tolerance level of opinion leaders and that of the mass
public. II Perhaps there is no tolerant society, but instead a tolerant
elite.
What if we were to revise Bollinger's hypothesis, making the
courts the educators of elites, and presuming that the elites-having
been taught tolerance by the judges-will help to create a more tolerant society? As thus revised, the theory would be more difficult to
refute, but it would remain highly conjectural. Since the 1960s very
important progress in promoting tolerance has been made on several fronts: civil rights, women's rights, gay rights, and the rights of
the handicapped and mentally ill, to mention only the most conspicuous examples. Whether and how these advances are attributable
to judicial pronouncements in free speech cases is difficult to
document.
Despite the free speech decisions of the past few decades,
America is now witnessing growing intolerance for some of the progress made in combating racial bias, frightful reminders of which
have been catapulted into headline news. Eruptions of widespread
racial bigotry and violence have been reported throughout American college campuses, at both elite private and large state universities, where the tolerance ethic is theoretically the sine qua non of
academic existence. Some commentators correlate these incidents
with a more overtly racist atmosphere in the country in the 1980s,
manifested in the racial confrontations in Forsyth County, Georgia,
and in the Howard Beach section of New York City.
Meanwhile, conservatives complain that conservative speakers
are shouted down when they try to address audiences in our elite
universities.
How does Professor Bollinger's theory explain this apparent
undoing of tolerance? Perhaps increased judicial protection for extremist speech, as in the Skokie case, encourages intolerance. Or
perhaps, as McClosky's polls suggest, free speech decisions do not
affect public attitudes. Either of these hypotheses seems at least as
plausible, and as consistent with the evidence, as Professor Bollinger's theory.
II.

/d., passim.

